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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ABDICATION BY ANOTHER NAME: AN ODE TO LOU FISHER

NEAL DEVINS*
Let me start with a confession. I find it a bit daunting to write a response
to Lou Fisher’s War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional
Abdication.1 Nineteen years ago, while working on a law school seminar
paper on budget policy, I took a chance and wrote Lou Fisher, one of the
leading scholars in the field. Lou took an interest in the paper and in me. Five
years later, an evolved version of that seminar paper and a paper I coauthored
with Lou on the item veto helped convince the William and Mary law school
to take a gamble and hire me. Over the past fifteen years, I have had numerous
occasions to critique Lou’s works. But these critiques were written for an
audience of one.
After this build up (suggesting that I am going into attack dog mode), I am
about to let the audience down. I agree with an awful lot of what Lou has to
say about the critical role that institutional competition plays in our system of
government and, with it, the horrible price our nation pays when members of
Congress place self interest ahead of all else. At the same time, Lou goes too
far in arguing that Congress has abdicated core powers and, in so doing, placed
democracy and self government at risk.2
***
No doubt, were the power of the purse and the power to declare war
transferred to the President, Congress’s ability to protect itself from outside
“encroachments” would be jeopardized.3 Indeed, stated at this level of
generality, pro-executive scholars would join ranks with Lou Fisher in arguing
that Congressional abdication of its war and appropriations powers would
undermine the separation of powers.4
* Goodrich Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. This observation is an outgrowth of
comments made at the “Congress: Does It Abdicate Power?” Symposium, St. Louis University
School of Law. Thanks to Joel Goldstein for inviting me to the Conference.
1. Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication, 19
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2000).
2. Id. at 7.
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356. (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961). For the
framers: “Ambition must be made to counter ambition.” Id.
4. Consider, for example, John Yoo, a scholar whose arguments resonate with defenders of
a strong presidency. Although claiming that Congress’s power to declare war has nothing to do
with the waging of war (including the decision to start a war), Yoo also argues that “the Framers
65
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But how does one define abdication?5 Does it require Congress — through
a constitutional amendment proposal — to formally transfer core legislative
responsibilities to the President? Alternatively, is it enough for Congress to
enact legislation which shifts some legislative power to the President? What
then of custom, say Congress’s practice of deferring to presidential military
initiatives? Finally, what about instances where Congress utilizes budgetary
procedures which may result in its following the President’s lead? For
example, did Congress abdicate power when it centralized budgetary
policymaking and, in so doing, embraced supply side economics during the
Reagan years?
For Lou Fisher, I think, the answer to all these questions is “yes.” All of
these categories are referred to in his paper as manifestations of Congress’s
abdication of its appropriations and war powers. Lou makes several nice
points in advancing his argument, especially when it comes to Congressional
war powers. But Lou’s definition of abdication, ultimately, is too expansive. It
discounts the ways that Congress participates in these disputes. Consider, for
example, budgetary policymaking. In here, Congress’s institutional interests
and the individual interests of its members are often aligned. Congress
remains a vital force in shaping budgetary policy. In contrast, the individual
and institutional interests of Congress are rarely aligned on war powers.
Consequently, I think, presidents are able to run roughshod over the
constitutional design (although not quite as rough shod as Lou would have us
believe).
I.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVANTAGE

Presidential power is much more than the “power to persuade.”6 Thanks to
the singularity of the office, Presidents are well positioned to advance their
interests before Congress, the nation, and the world. Critics of the modern day
presidency, including Theodore Lowi and Jeffrey Tullis, put it this way:
“[R]egularly ‘go[ing] over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large,” the
powers of the American people have been invested in a single office, “making

intended Congress to participate in war-making by controlling appropriations.” John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 167, 295 (1996).
5. Commenting on “Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers,” a paper that
Lou presented at St. Louis University last year, Doug Williams provided an insightful discussion
of how the line separating delegation (something that Lou considers an essential part of modern
government) and abdication “remains blurred.” Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and
Explaining Congressional Abdication: Why Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 49 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1013, 1014 (1999).
6. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY, at X
(1960).
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[it] the most powerful office in the world.”7 Even defenders of presidential
power recognize that Presidents are motivated to seek power and have the tools
to accomplish the task. “The opportunities for presidential imperialism are too
numerous to count” according to Terry Moe and William Howell, “because,
when presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can put whatever
decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in
pushing out the boundaries of their power.”8
When presidents act, moreover, it is up to the other branches to respond.
In other words, presidents often win by default — either because Congress
chooses not to respond or its response is ineffective. Furthermore, by end
running the burdensome and ofttimes unsuccessful strategy of seeking
legislative authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional
powers and prerogatives of the presidency. In other words, the President’s
personal interests and the presidency’s institutional interests are often one and
the same. Witness, for example, executive orders: between 1973 and 1998,
presidents issued roughly 1,000 executive orders. Only thirty-seven of these
orders were challenged in Congress. More striking, only three of these
challenges resulted in legislation.9
Presidents, of course, sometimes need Congress to enact legislation. When
Bill Clinton introduced his health care initiative, its fate rested in the hands of
Congress. Here, Congress had the upper hand. Rather than having to do battle
with the President on his own field (enacting legislation that is subject to a
presidential veto), it is up to the President to overcome the burden of inertia —
cajoling Congress into action. As such, modern day presidents often advance
their agenda through unilateral action, not legislative strategies.10
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members
of Congress are often in conflict with one another. While each of Congress’s
535 members has some stake in Congress as an institution, parochial interests
will overwhelm this collective good. In particular, members of Congress need
to be reelected to advance their (and their constituents’) interests. For this
reason, lawmakers are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each
has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency.”11

7. JEFFREY K. TULLIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE
PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED, at x-xi (1985).
8. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999).
9. Id. at 165-66.
10. See generally RICHARD NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). See also
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 97-120 (1996) (commenting on abortion).
11. Moe & Howell, supra note 8, at 144.
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Nowhere is the gap between presidential and legislative incentives starker
than war powers. To start with, as Lou Fisher and others have shown, the
constitutional design envisions (at a minimum) a significant congressional
role.12 Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate, Congress has very
little incentive to play a leadership role. “Rather than opposing the President
on a potential military action,” members of Congress “find it more convenient
to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary mission.”13
Presidents, in contrast, often have strong incentives to launch military
strikes. Presidents achieve status, fame if you will, by leading the nation into
battle.14 Unwilling to overcome the burden of inertia and rein in the President,
Congress typically stands by on the sidelines (or worse yet proclaims that the
President is the sole organ of military affairs).15 In this way, the institutional
powers of the President expand through every fame-inducing exercise of self
interest.
II. RETHINKING THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVANTAGE
The singularity of the office (combined with the tools to execute, that is,
put programs into effect) allows presidents to take unilateral action. But
presidents oft times are dependent on other parts of the government and the
people. When this happens, the individual interests of the President may
conflict with the institutional interests of the presidency. In such battles,
presidents invariably place their own interests ahead of the institution.
Take the case of George Bush, a president who launched an
“unprecedented effort to implement a serious and systematic legal strategy for

12. See generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); JOHN HART ELY,
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO
HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCHES? (1992). Indeed, legal academics who served as
presidential appointee’s in the Justice Department’s Office for Legal Counsel do not disagree
with this claim. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1317, 1327 n.36 (1997); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the
Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997); Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War:
Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1995). But see H.
Jefferson Powell, The Founders and The President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1471 (1999).
13. FISHER, supra note 12, at 1006. See also Dante Fascell, War Powers and Congress, 50
U. MIAMI L. REV. 121, 124 (1995) (commenting on leadership in Congress).
14. For this very reason, the framers intended that Congress play the dominant role in
initiating military actions. See Treanor, supra note 12.
15. Presidents likewise have succeeded in side-stepping the Constitution’s demand that
Congress ratifies treaties. Specifically, by negotiating agreements with foreign nations (executive
agreements), presidents accomplish through unilateral action what might not be accomplished
through the constitutional design. See also Moe & Howell, supra note 8, at 163-64.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

ABDICATION BY ANOTHER NAME

69

the defense of the presidency.”16 Notwithstanding this effort, the Bush
administration regularly sacrificed institutional interests in order to advance
incremental policy objectives. To quiet a controversy in Congress over
Reagan administration efforts to kill affirmative action, for example, the Bush
administration did not exercise its authority to speak the Federal
Communications Commission’s voice before the Supreme Court. Instead, it
cut a deal to allow the Commission to represent itself. As a result, while
Commission attorneys vigorously defended race preferences, the Solicitor
General (representing the United States) filed an amicus brief challenging the
constitutionality of Commission policies.17 Far more significant, through the
so-called “Baker accord,” four committees of Congress as well as party leaders
were given veto power over the fractious issue of funding the Nicaraguan
Contras.18 Although White House counsel C. Boyden Gray objected to this
level of involvement by Congress in foreign policy, especially through what
seemed to him an unconstitutional legislative veto, the President cared more
about funding the Contras than defending his institutional prerogatives.19
The Baker Accord is telling for other reasons. It calls attention to
Congress’s penchant for reactive “fire alarm” oversight. As public choice
theory suggests, lawmakers often devise legislation at the behest of powerful
interest groups. When there is a dominant interest group, legislation will often
specify the devilish details of administration. Yet, since the details of
administration cannot always be anticipated (when there is a dominant group)
and since interest groups often compete with each other, legislation is often
ambiguous. As such, oversight enables lawmakers to respond to ongoing
constituency pressures. In other words, lawmakers, by necessity and design,
may well establish “a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that
enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine
administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), charge executive agencies
with violating congressional goals, and seek remedies from agencies, courts,
and Congress itself.”20

16. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 21
(1995).
17. This episode is recounted in Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control of Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 293-97(1994).
18. See generally LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1988); William Safire, Taking Baker to the Cleaners, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1990, at A21.
19. See David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Bush Counsel Contest Contra Aid Plan; Gray Feels
Pact with Congress May Infringe on Presidential Power, WASHINGTON POST, March 26, 1989, at
A5; Lund, supra note 16, at 64-66.
20. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). See also Harold H.
Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984).
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Witness the “Baker Accord.” Rather than reach a firm decision on how
much aid could go to the Contras, Congress established procedures which
allowed it to play a reactive role.21 If constituency pressures supported
continuing funding, the committees would not exercise their veto. If
continuing funding proved politically problematic, however, the committees
could exercise their veto without having to do battle with the White House. In
so doing, Congress minimized the cost of decision making.
Another example of reactive congressional oversight is appropriations
riders. By forbidding the expenditure of appropriations on activities that
Congress disapproves of, appropriation riders allow Congress to derail
presidential initiatives (without enacting freestanding legislation setting forth
congressional policy).22 Typically, riders limit domestic policy initiatives. But
Congress has also limited military initiatives this way, most notably during the
Vietnam War.23
Here, I think, is where Lou may overstate his claim about Congress’s
abdication of war making power. First, rather than play no role, Congress may
prefer to play a reactive role.24 In particular, through appropriations, treaty
ratifications, confirmations, and other types of oversight, Congress is very
much in the business of shaping military strategy.25 Second, when there is a
real risk of significant casualties, Presidents may well turn to Congress for
authorization. The “contemporary President,” as Lou observes in his paper, is
well equipped to wage war without Congressional authorization because
“military technology now enables Presidents to wage war with few
casualties.”26 Indeed, not a single U.S. casualty resulted from either 1998 air
strikes against Iraq or the 1999 attacks against Serbia. Under these
circumstances, Presidents can wage little wars without fearing the ire of a
reactive Congress.

21. See WALSH, supra note 18.
22. See generally Neal Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (1987).
23. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312-14 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing
congressional attempts to limit authorization of bombing in Cambodia), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
24. This is not to say, however, that Congress does not pay a heavy price for playing a
reactive, not leadership, role. Aside from making a mockery of the Framers’ design, Congress
may find it difficult to intercede. For example, the impulse to rally round the troops may translate
into ineffectual oversight. Lou’s chronicling of Congress’s ever diminishing role in war powers
buttresses this conclusion.
25. A recent example is the Senate’s rejection of a treaty banning the testing of nuclear
weapons. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Loss for Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A1. Moreover, through its confirmation power, Congress (especially
during the Clinton years) has affected military policymaking. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (forthcoming).
26. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 50.
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In contrast, Presidents may see the need to seek congressional approval
when American lives are on the line. For example, notwithstanding all his
bravado, George Bush did seek Congressional approval before going to war
against Iraq. Here, the President may fear being blamed for recklessly
endangering American lives and, as such, may seek cover in congressional
action.27 Needless to say, the President’s dominant role in military affairs,
party loyalty, and the President’s ability to send a singular message to the
people (through press coverage and speeches) will probably allow the
President to get his way with Congress.28 Nevertheless, I would draw a line
between presidential advantage and congressional abdication.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL ADVANTAGE
What then about the budget? Here, the institutional interests of Congress
and the self interests of its members should coalesce. Specifically, members
have a strong interest in rewarding their constituents through appropriations.
And when members of Congress control the appropriations process, well, the
power of Congress itself is strengthened. Moreover, unlike military strikes
(where the President can act without Congressional authorization), Congress
cannot be shut out of the appropriations process. It must enact a budget. In
other words, the President’s agenda control advantage on budgetary matters is,
at best, a muted one.
So much for theory. According to Lou, Congress has abdicated its control
over the appropriations process. In support of this proposition, Lou cites the
following evidence: (1) Members of Congress depict themselves as budget
dunces and, more significantly, have enacted legislation (Gramm-RudmanHollings; Line Item Veto Act of 1996) which formally transfers some of their
appropriations power; (2) Presidents, although submitting budgets at least as
large as Congress, have waged a successful rhetorical campaign in which they
depict themselves as committed to fiscal restraint; (3) Centralization in
budgeting — an outgrowth of the Budget Act of 1974 — has both advantaged
the President in his negotiations with Congress and contributed to run away
budget deficits.

27. As Lou points out, Bush claimed both that he did not need Congressional authorization
and that, if Congress turned him down, he would have ordered troops into combat. See Fisher,
supra note 1, at 27-28. I place little stock in these post-hoc claims. Had Congress voted him
down, I suspect that Bush would have found the cost of waging war on his own authority too
great.
28. Indeed, the more Congress defers to presidential initiatives, the harder it is for Congress
to resist such presidential entreaties. Why? Well, Congress, the press, the people, and the
President come to see war making as an executive function. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 980-83
(the press); id. at 977-80 (the Congress); Fisher, supra note 1, at 49 (the people); id. at 51-53 (the
President).
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Each of these three charges is significant and, I think, that Lou has done a
good job in supporting each of these claims. But I do not think that Lou has
shown that Congress has abdicated its authority on budgetary matters. To
begin with, Congress, its appropriations committees, and its members are very
much engaged in budgetary policy making. Although the Budget Act of 1974
embraced centralizing procedures (the creation of both the Congressional
Budget Office and Budget Committees to oversee the budget process), power
was not formally transferred from existing authorization, appropriations, or
tax-writing committees.29 Moreover, powerful members of Congress are well
served by centralization. For example, in working out the specific terms of
omnibus appropriations bills, the status and authority of party leaders is
enhanced. Finally, presidential participation in budget summits, negotiations
over the terms of omnibus and other appropriations measures, and the like is
very much tied to the President’s veto power. In other words, the
constitutional design envisions a significant presidential role in budgetary and
other lawmaking.
None of this is to suggest that the budget process works well. It may be
that centralization in budgeting encourages Congress and the President to build
their budget proposals around unrealistic assumptions and, in so doing,
contributes to the national debt.30 Also, while Presidents often make
concessions to Congress in their budget negotiations, centralization makes it
easier for the President to shape the budget. In FY 1988, for example, Ronald
Reagan used his veto threat to preserve funds for anti-abortion counseling and
for foreign assistance. More significant, Reagan pushed through a provision
on Contra aid and the withdrawal of language codifying the fairness doctrine.
Reagan, however, did have to swallow $23 billion in tax increases.31
Effective presidential leadership in negotiating the terms of budget
agreements seems a far cry from the outright transfer of Congress’s power of
the purse. What then of the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the Line
Item Veto Act of 1996? Here, Congress did seem to relinquish some control of
its budget making authority.
Under Gramm-Rudman, Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust
either its own internal budgetary process or the President’s. Through an
automatic sequestration procedure, Congress sought to ensure that the budget
conformed to statutorily specified deficit reduction targets.32 With deficit
targets, automatic sequestration, and a formal OMB role in projecting deficits,
29. See ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING, AND TAXING 78
(1980).
30. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 39, 60; Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of
Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1990).
31. See Janet Hook, Budget Deal Enacted at Last, Congress Adjourns, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 3183 (1987).
32. In 1990, deficit targets were abandoned in favor of caps on spending and increased taxes.
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Gramm-Rudman certainly constrained Congressional discretion in budgeting.
But Gramm-Rudman did not alter the fundamental budgetary balance of
power: Congress helped set deficit reduction targets, it specified that the
sequestration apply to both domestic and foreign spending, it exempted a
number of social programs from the sequestration process, and it delegated
much of the Act’s implementation to an officer of Congress (the Comptroller
General).33 Moreover, in an effort to protect their spending priorities,
appropriations committees and subcommittees worked hard to end run GrammRudman’s byzantine structure.34 With that said, Congress’s repeated claims
that it could not be trusted to keep its fiscal house in order set the stage for item
veto legislation.
At first blush, the Line Item Veto Act looks like a wholesale abdication of
Congress’s power of the purse. By allowing the President to rescind
appropriations, Congress seemed to transfer its power both to set expenditure
levels (Presidential rescissions effectively reduce appropriations levels) and
budget priorities (the President could veto programs he disfavored while
leaving untouched programs he favored). In practice, however, the item veto
was more bark than bite. First, by identifying program priorities in unofficial
and informal documents, Congress could communicate its preferences to
agencies without subjecting its handiwork to presidential cancellations. Since
agencies are unlikely to risk retaliation in subsequent legislative cycles, this
informal mechanism would work as well as either statutory or committee
report specifications.35 Second, the aggressive use of rescission authority is not
in the President’s self interest (even if it enhances the power of the
presidency). Congressional and interest group pressure would make it
politically costly for the President to do more than tinker at the margins. In
particular, since any rescinded appropriation would go into a lockbox for
deficit reduction, presidents could not shift funds (and thereby reward political
allies or constituent interests). As such, presidents risk making enemies and
little else by invoking their cancellation authority.36 Bill Clinton’s cautious use
of Item Veto Act authority bears this out.37
33. For this reason, the original statute was struck down because it undermined the
President’s power to implement the law. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
34. See Louis Fisher, Continuing Resolutions: Can’t Live With ‘em, Can’t Live Without ‘em,
48 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 101 (1988).
35. See generally Neal Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item
Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605 (1997); Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint:
The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999).
36. Mike Fitts takes this point one step further and argues that the singular nature of the
presidency can, in fact, limit presidential power. See Michael A Fitts, The Paradox of Power in
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized, Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 895 (1996).
37. Would this caution have continued? I think so. With the Supreme Court’s invalidation
of the statute we will never know. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1997).
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Gramm-Rudman and item veto legislation, at the same time, make clear
that Congress is willing to forfeit some of its appropriations power.
Apparently, members are willing to trade off some institutional power in order
to reap the gains of telling the nation that they are serious about the deficit. At
the same time, neither Gramm-Rudman nor item veto legislation formally
limits the power of individual members of Congress to reward their
constituents. In this way, while these bills suggest a willingness to diminish its
power of the purse, Congress very much cares about its power to reward
constituents through appropriations. For this reason, I think Lou goes too far
in suggesting that these measures are proof positive that Congress has
abdicated its appropriations power.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time to wrap up: Lou Fisher has done a wonderful job in calling
attention to ways in which core Congressional powers have diminished in
recent decades. But Lou’s proof is of diminished power, not power transferred
to the President. With that said, for our system of checks and balances to
work, Congress must step up to the plate and reassert its institutional priorities.
Otherwise, there is a risk — especially in war powers — that the constitutional
division of power and, with it, the Constitution itself will eventually become
irrelevant.

